Today in Reeves v. Swift Transportation Co. Inc., (published), the 6th Circuit affirmed the summary judgment dismissing Reeves' pregnancy discrimination claim. Very nice case for employers. Reeves was a truck-driver. That position for Swift required extensive lifting. When she became pregnant, Reeves' physician restricted her from performing the lifting. Reeves repeatedly requested a light duty position from Swift, but was consistently denied because under Swift's policy, light duty positions are only available for persons injured on the job. Reeves was eventually discharged because Swift had no work for her. (She did not qualify for FMLA leave.) After going to the EEOC, Reeves filed suit arguing that Swift's policy constituted "per se" pregnancy discrimination. The Court summarized Reeves' argument as follows:
Reeves says that the policy’s terms are themselves discriminatory because they provide light duty work to employees injured on the job who can perform no heavy lifting but not to pregnancy employees who can do no heavy lifting. This part of the policy, Reeves argues, violates the Act’s provision that pregnant employees “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). A person injured on the job with the same work abilities as Reeves, the argument goes, receives light duty and therefore has been treated better than Reeves.
The Court did not accept this argument, reasoning, instead:
Swift’s policy cannot be viewed as direct evidence of discrimination because the Act merely requires employers to “ignore” employee pregnancies. See Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n employer is obliged to ignore a woman’s pregnancy . . .”); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994). Swift’s light-duty policy is indisputably pregnancy-blind. It simply does not grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. It makes this determination on the nonpregnancy-related basis of whether there has been a work-related injury or condition. Pregnancy-blind policies of course can be tools of discrimination. But challenging them as tools of discrimination requires evidence and inference beyond such policies’ express terms.
Because Reeves had no evidence Swift applied the policy in a discriminatory manner (for example, granting light duty to non-pregnant employees injured off the job), the Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing her disparate treatment claim.
